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Problem-solving or Self-enhancement? A Power Perspective on How CEOs Affect R&D 
Search in the Face of Inconsistent Feedback 
 
ABSTRACT 
Firms consider multiple reference points simultaneously to assess performance, yet often these 
referents may be inconsistent in signaling success or failure. Consequently, decision makers use 
two contrasting decision rules when responding to inconsistent feedback: problem-solving or 
self-enhancement. So far, disparate theoretical logics and mixed evidence has limited our 
understanding about when decision makers may shift their attention from positive to negative 
aspects of inconsistent feedback or vice versa, and may increase or decrease their R&D search. 
We examine how different types of CEO power explain why some firms may respond to 
inconsistent feedback, i.e. positive performance feedback and negative prospects, in distinct 
ways. We find that firms engaged in less R&D search as a response to inconsistent feedback 
when CEOs had high levels of structural, ownership or expert power. In contrast, when CEOs 
had high levels of prestige power, firms undertook more R&D search as a response to 
inconsistent feedback. Our findings provide new insights and contribute to conversations about 
CEO power and performance feedback within the context of the behavioral theory of the firm. 
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Research on the role of performance feedback in understanding organizational behavior has been 
burgeoning (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012), and scholars have devoted substantial 
attention to addressing the impact of performance feedback on strategic decisions such as 
investment in research and development (R&D) (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003). Although 
earlier studies have largely focused on the effects of single performance referents, scholars have 
suggested that decision makers use multiple and diverse reference points simultaneously when 
gauging organizational performance (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Chen, 2008; 
Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). If these differ in terms of signaling success or failure, decision 
makers are confronted with inconsistent feedback that causes important distortions in 
performance assessment and decision-making processes (Baum et al., 2005; Chen, 2008; Hu, He, 
Blettner, & Bettis, 2017; Joseph & Gaba, 2015; Lucas, Knopen, Meeus, 2018). For instance, 
interpretive efforts of inconsistent feedback may amplify differences in opinion and may cause 
intense debates among senior executives and other stakeholders which complicates decision 
making (Greve & Gaba, 2017). Because of these complex and challenging circumstances, 
scholars have proposed two contrasting decision rules that decision makers may use when 
assessing and responding to inconsistent feedback (Audia & Brion, 2007; Greve, 1998). 
The first decision rule – referred to as problem-solving (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 
2003) – suggests that decision makers prioritize those indicators that fall below aspirations. 
Assuming that individuals are motivated to solve problems, they try to reduce negative 
discrepancies between actual and desired outcomes by engaging in problemistic R&D search. 
The second decision rule – referred to as self-enhancement (Audia & Brion, 2007; Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997) – predicts that decision makers give greater attention to performance referents that 
are above the aspiration level. Because of the desire to protect their self-image, they tend to 
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portray inconsistent feedback more positively and judge R&D search to be unnecessary (Audia 
& Brion, 2007; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). Empirical evidence about which 
decision rule prevails when dealing with inconsistent feedback has been rather inconclusive and 
mixed. Whereas Greve (1998) did not find any significant effect between inconsistent feedback 
and new product introductions, others have found support for either the problem-solving (Baum 
et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2017; Joseph & Gaba, 2015) or self-enhancing perspective (Lucas et al., 
2018). These disparate findings clearly signal the need for a deeper understanding about the 
conditions under which decision makers may act as problem-solvers or self-enhancers when 
responding to inconsistent feedback. Hence, we respond to recent calls for providing more 
exhaustive explanations (Greve & Gaba, 2017; Lucas et al., 2018) and advance research about 
how inconsistent feedback affects organizational adaptation in at least three important ways. 
First, we bring together disparate theoretical logics and identify when decision makers 
problem-solve or self-enhance while interpreting and responding to inconsistent feedback. Given 
the profound impact of chief executive officers (CEOs) on decision-making processes and 
strategic actions (Quigley & Hambrick, 2015), we examine how CEO power serves as a 
foundational source of bias and shapes decision rules when considering inconsistent feedback. 
Referred to as the capacity of individuals to influence other coalition members (Finkelstein, 
1992: 506), powerful CEOs may not only employ explicit influence tactics such as information 
withholding or agenda control but also exercise their power more implicitly by shaping the 
norms governing decisions and other executives’ interpretive schemes (Pfeffer, 1981). Our 
contingency model augments research on performance feedback and self-enhancement theory 
(Jordan & Audia, 2012) and sheds light on controversies from both theories’ predictions about 
how decision makers may respond to inconsistent feedback. 
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Second, although research has acknowledged that CEOs play a critical role in shaping 
strategic decision making (Quickley & Hambrick, 2015), it has typically assumed self-enhancing 
biases to be prevalent among powerful CEOs (Jordan & Audia, 2012; Pfeffer & Fong, 2005). We 
move beyond such a restricted focus on power and self-serving attributions and forward a more 
balanced view about the impact of CEO power on the assessment process of and subsequent 
response to inconsistent feedback. Since CEO power may come from various sources associated 
with different types of power including structural, ownership, expert and prestige power 
(Finkelstein, 1992), we suggest that what distinguishes powerful CEOs from using either the 
problem-solving or self-enhancement decision rule is their underlying basis of power. Even 
when confronted with similar inconsistent feedback, we recognize that each type of CEO power 
shapes attention shifts to either positive or negative parts of inconsistent feedback, and hence, 
explains whether firms ultimately increase their R&D search or not (Greve & Gaba, 2017). 
Third, recent studies examining the consequences of inconsistent feedback have almost 
exclusively focused on internal contradictions among backward-looking performance 
assessments such as the ones based on historical and social aspirations (Hu et al., 2015; Joseph & 
Gaba, 2015; Lucas et al., 2018). Yet, forward-looking prospects indicate whether probable 
outcomes of planned behavior would result in the successful achievement of set targets (Chen, 
2008; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Greve, 2003). Because the allocation of resources to R&D 
requires complex judgement about future prospects (Arrfelt, Wiseman, & Hult, 2013), we argue 
that CEOs are particularly confronted with inconsistencies when they have positive feedback 
about past performance, yet receive poor future prospects. By using this configuration of 
inconsistent feedback, we are able to explore how distinct sources of CEO power affect the 
tendencies that firms may resist problemistic search and persist with outdated strategies that have 
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proven to be successful in the past (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991). For completeness, we also 
show the results for the alternative configuration of inconsistent performance referents where 
performance feedback is negative but future prospects are positive. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Building on the seminal work of Cyert & March (1963), scholars have widely considered 
the role of performance feedback in organizational behavior. Portraying performance feedback as 
a performance evaluation process during which current performance is evaluated against an 
aspiration level, the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) generally suggests that firms initiate 
problemistic search when they perform below aspiration levels (Posen, Keil, Kim, Meissner, 
2018). Scholars have discerned various types of problemistic search behaviors, including new 
product introductions (Greve, 1998), acquisitions (Iyer, & Miller, 2008) and strategic 
investments (Souder & Bromiley, 2012), yet most studies have considered R&D search, or the 
allocation of resources to R&D, as a key behavioral consequence of performance feedback 
(Shinkle, 2012). Research has also established that performance is often evaluated using 
historical and social aspiration levels so that current performance is compared with either the 
past performance of the focal organization or its peers (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). Reflecting 
such a backward-looking search model, BTOF generally predicts that firms allocate resources to 
R&D when the discrepancy between current performance and aspiration levels increases. 
Although the backward-looking search model has dominated performance feedback 
research (Gavetti et al., 2012), scholars have argued that the allocation of resources to R&D 
reflects a forward-looking search model that requires complex judgments about future prospects 
(Arrfelt et al., 2013). Rather than being focused on remedying potential deficiencies between 
past performance and aspirations, the forward-looking search model suggests that firms increase 
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R&D when performance prospects indicate that their future performance might not be sufficient 
to meet current targets (Chen, 2008). For instance, financial analysts’ estimates pointing towards 
unsatisfactory prospects might be particularly salient to decision makers due to the estimates’ 
impact on investors’ behavior, and the associated negative consequences for firms and their 
senior executives (e.g., Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). Financial analysts’ estimates falling below 
performance targets represent negative forward-looking prospects, which indicate that given 
current managerial choices, future performance might not be satisfactory to meet set targets. 
Although empirical evidence seems to support the notion that negative forward-looking 
prospects trigger problemistic R&D search among firms (Chen, 2008), scholars have suggested 
that both backward- and forward-looking decision-making processes need to be taken into 
account because they act in tandem in determining the allocation of resources to R&D (Arrfelt et 
al., 2013; Chen, 2008). Especially important for understanding the consequences of negative 
prospects could be when backward-looking feedback is positive, which indicates that past 
managerial choices were able to generate desired levels of performance, because it introduces 
inconsistency in the performance assessments. 
When backward-looking feedback and forward-looking prospects are inconsistent, 
comparisons of current performance levels relative to those from the past and those foreseen in 
the future diverge systematically (Hu et al., 2017; Joseph & Gaba, 2015). Hence, internal 
contradictions between distinct aspects of firm performance make an unequivocal assessment 
unlikely (Lucas et al., 2018). For instance, when firms are able to achieve their past targets and 
demonstrate strong performance, stakeholders start extrapolating from past successes and form 
the opinion that the firm has the right capabilities to deliver similar levels of value (Mishina, 
Block, & Mannor, 2012). When firms then receive signals of potential failure to meet targets, 
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such inconsistency in performance feedback may lead to intense debate among those involved in 
decision making (Desai, 2016; Joseph & Gaba, 2015). Originating from different personal 
ambitions, interests, and cognitive representations of future states (Allison, 1971; Chen, 2008), 
divergent preferences for responses may emerge because of dissimilar formal positions and 
responsibilities. It may raise subjectivity of performance evaluations that may lead to attention 
shifts among multiple reference points (Greve, 1998; Lucas et al., 2018). Stakeholders, such as 
other top management team (TMT) members or board of directors (BOD), may try to steer 
discussions and start using influence tactics to advance their own opinions and interests (Fang, 
Kim, & Milliken, 2014; Westphal & Bednar, 2008). Earlier studies have suggested that attention 
shifts and the prioritization of individual rather than organizational goals could lead to negative 
performance prospects being recoded as temporary, which curbs the tendency to engage in 
problemistic search (Jordan & Audia, 2012). To deal with the complexity of decision making and 
the cognitively challenging nature of assessing and responding to inconsistent feedback, research 
has suggested that decisions makers use decision rules that guide their behavior (Greve, 2003). 
In accordance with literatures on heuristics, scholars have broadly categorized two 
diametrically opposed decision rules; the problem-solving and the self-enhancement rule (Audia 
& Brion, 2007; Greve, 1998; Hu et al., 2017). Problem-solvers prioritize the negative aspect of 
the inconsistent feedback and engage in more R&D search (Baum et al., 2005). Indeed, 
successfully achieving one goal frees up managerial attention and enables the firm to allocate 
more resources to problemistic search when another goal is not achieved (Hu et al., 2017). Such 
facets of inconsistent feedback shape decision makers’ perceptions of the situation as an 
opportunity to restore firm performance and motivate them to identify potential solutions through 
investing in problemistic search (Shimizu, 2007). Self-enhancers, on the other hand, prioritize 
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the positive aspect of the inconsistent feedback and engage in less R&D search (Audia & Brion, 
2007). Concerned with being held responsible for the negative aspect of the inconsistent 
feedback and motivated to protect their self-image and position, self-enhancers consider the 
positive part of the inconsistent feedback as an opportunity to hide potential problems and avoid 
attempts to remedy anticipated performance shortfalls (Audia & Brion, 2007; Jordan & Audia, 
2012). Despite earlier studies explicating disparate theoretical logics underlying each decision 
rule, empirical evidence about which decision rule prevails when dealing with inconsistent 
feedback has been rather inconclusive. So far, it is rather unclear when decision makers act as 
problem-solvers or self-enhancers when responding to inconsistent feedback. 
CEO Power, Inconsistent Feedback and R&D Search 
CEOs are considered to be the most influential decision maker within firms and to play a 
critical role in explaining firms’ actions and performance (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; 
Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). For instance, studies have shown that CEO attributes and 
preferences determine strategic investments, changes in organizational structure and cultural 
values (Hambrick, 2007; Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011). Together with such a consequential 
role in the firm, comes the fact that CEOs are often being held accountable for firm performance, 
which could lead to dismissal when the firm is underperforming, or may lead to promotion and 
pay raise in case of outstanding results (Chen, Luo, Tang, & Tong, 2015; Crossland & Chen, 
2013). As such, CEOs might be particularly motivated to shape the ways in which inconsistent 
feedback about backward- and forward-looking referents is approached and assessed.  
Nevertheless, CEOs rarely make critical decisions in isolation and studies have sought to 
explain how the interactions between CEOs and other TMT members, the BOD as well as other 
stakeholders may shape decision-making processes regarding performance feedback (Boeker, 
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1997; Desai, 2016; Fang, Kim, & Milliken, 2014). By so doing, earlier theorizing has 
demonstrated that power is an inherent component of the performance evaluation process and 
showed how CEOs may use interpersonal influence tactics to deal with pressures from other 
senior executives and external constituents (Westphal & Bednar, 2005). Accordingly, we suggest 
that CEO power, referred to as the CEO’s capacity to influence other stakeholders (Finkelstein 
1992; Pfeffer, 1981), shapes the way in which firms respond to inconsistent feedback and 
explains the extent to which either the problem-solving or self-enhancement rule manifests itself 
in decisions about R&D search. Importantly, power gives opportunities to CEOs but also entails 
responsibilities (De Wit, Scheepers, Ellemers, Sassenberg, & Scholl, 2017; Williams, 2014). For 
instance, powerful CEOs have access to valuable resources and tend to be more optimistic about 
the success of their chosen courses of action (Gupta, Han, Nanda, & Silveri, 2016; Finkelstein, 
1992). Therefore, they might have more confidence in solving the problem that has caused the 
inconsistency in performance feedback and prospects, and intensify R&D search as a result. 
However, powerful CEOs are also held personally responsible for firm outcomes (Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994), which means that they may feel threatened by inconsistencies in performance 
assessments, and therefore, start engaging in self-enhancement behaviors and steer decision 
making towards reducing R&D search. A threat to their ability to exercise power and to be in 
control leads decision makers to act defensively. As such, they may use their power to advance 
their own interests in order to maintain their position (Deng, Zheng, & Guinote, 2018). 
We investigate specific sources of power in order to understand how CEO power affects 
the choice of problem-solving and self-enhancement rules when CEOs are faced with negative 
prospects and positive feedback. In the context of strategic decision making, Finkelstein (1992) 
noted that four types – associated with different sources – of CEO power are critical: structural, 
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ownership, expert, and prestige power. CEO structural power is based on formal organizational 
structure and hierarchical authority, and defines the interpersonal dynamics within TMTs (Patel 
& Cooper, 2014). CEO ownership power is determined by the CEO’s position in the principal–
agent relationship, and indicates how the CEO interacts with the BOD and powerful shareholders 
(Canella & Shen, 2001). CEO expert power is derived from the CEO’s exposure and 
relationships with stakeholders within the firm’s task environment, such as employees, suppliers 
and customers (Park & Tzabbar, 2016). Finally, CEO prestige power is based on the CEO’s 
reputation and standing within the firm’s institutional environment (Finkelstein, 1992). Each of 
the four types of power can be classified along broader categories of power including ‘harsh’ 
versus ‘soft’ power or ‘control’ versus ‘persuasive’ power (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 
1998; Turner, 2005). In this respect, CEO structural and ownership power are considered to be 
‘harsh’ or ‘control’ concepts of power, that arise from formal positions within the organization 
and give CEOs legitimate authority to control the behavior of others. On the contrary, CEO 
expert and prestige power can be defined as ‘soft’ or ‘persuasive’ concepts of power that emerge 
from personal characteristics of individuals such as superior knowledge, experience, background 
and mutual relationships (Raven et al., 1998). 
Overall, we expect powerful CEOs to problem-solve when the source of their power 
provides them with opportunities to influence others in such a way that addressing inconsistent 
feedback does not threaten their position and self-image. Rather, we argue that CEOs tend to 
self-enhance when their source of power does not provide such opportunities and inconsistent 
feedback threatens their position, or when they lack confidence that they are able to address 
inconsistent feedback in an effective way. Our theoretical model is summarized in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
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-------------------------------------------- 
CEO structural power. The concentration of power in a firm’s CEO has been shown to 
lead to more biased attributions of information (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012), which might facilitate 
self-enhancement attempts in dealing with inconsistent feedback. In addition, TMT members 
tend to engage in political behaviors and to start secretly building coalitions in order to enhance 
their influence (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). Earlier research has revealed that such a 
politicized context may weaken social bonds and interrupt habitual cooperation based on trusted 
relationships within TMTs. This reduces the willingness of decision makers to share private 
information, which could negatively impact problem-solving and increase the tendency of 
powerful CEOs to underweight advice from others (Tost, Gino & Larrick, 2012). CEO structural 
power thus paralyzes constructive debate during which openly questioning the effectiveness of 
organizational behavior is deemed inappropriate (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Park, Westphal, 
& Stern, 2011) and self-enhancement is more likely to occur. Given the more stringent set of 
cognitive and social resources that is dedicated to the evaluation process, decision makers are 
more constrained when assessing inconsistent feedback and identifying alternative responses 
(Abebe, Angriawan, & Liu, 2011; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Tang, Crossan & Rowe, 2011). Such 
cognitive constraints may prime structurally powerful CEOs to perceive threats to their self-
image because of concerns that the identified solution for R&D search will be insufficient to 
align future prospects with past successes (Shen & Cannella, 2002; Zhang, 2006). In order to 
safeguard their powerful position, we argue that such CEOs become more inclined to shift 
attention away from goals related to collective improvements and problem-solving efforts to 
those related to their self-enhancing interests (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011). 
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In order to reduce complexity of decision making and weakening of their own position in 
the assessment of inconsistent feedback, structurally powerful CEOs would use their power to 
control the TMT’s strategic agenda (Zhang, 2006). They may distort available information by 
putting counterfactual aspects on the agenda (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Also, they may monitor 
more closely discussion about issues such as future growth in demand or the impact of 
technological change, so that the resulting assessments of future prospects are compatible with 
their own self-enhancing interests (Jordan & Audia, 2012). Hence, by scheduling topics and 
manipulating assessments, structurally powerful CEOs may protect their position by shifting the 
performance evaluation process from negative prospects to positive performance feedback. 
Overall, we suggest that structurally powerful CEOs prompt self-enhancing assessments of 
inconsistent feedback and avoid R&D investments. 
Hypothesis 1: A greater inconsistency between positive performance feedback and 
negative performance prospects will result in less R&D search when the firm’s CEO has 
more structural power. 
CEO ownership power. Although CEO ownership has been associated with a greater 
alignment between the interests of the CEO and other shareholders (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Grossman, 2002), significant levels of equity and voting rights of CEOs reduce the influence of 
the BOD and enables CEOs to exercise more discretion in decision making (Finkelstein, 1992; 
Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). Additionally, significant ownership links the wealth, status, and 
career of CEOs more tightly to how firm performance is assessed by others (Gentry & Shen, 
2013; Hoskisson et al., 2002). As such, ownership power bears higher risks on CEOs when their 
firm might fail (Lange, Boivie, & Westphal, 2015), suggesting that such CEOs might be prone to 
engage in self-enhancement as a way to avoid losses related to potential negative interpretations 
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of the inconsistent feedback by the BODs and shareholders. Higher ownership, indeed, may 
provide CEOs with control over strategic actions that are compatible with their own interests 
(Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993) and ultimately distract the BODs and other stakeholders 
from problem-solving attempts in order to deal with negative prospects. 
When faced with inconsistencies between past success and negative prospects, we argue 
that CEOs with significant firm ownership try to ensure that outsiders interpret inconsistent 
feedback more positively in order to retain their authority in decision making. Having invested 
substantial time and effort in advancing the firm, CEOs can use their information advantage over 
outsiders to self-enhance when receiving inconsistent feedback (Feldman & Montgomery, 2015; 
Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). For instance, they may present negative prospects to be temporary 
in nature and non-threatening to the future performance of the firm, thereby preventing investors 
from publicly voicing their concerns and dissatisfaction (Westphal & Bednar, 2008). Rather than 
signaling that something may be wrong and allocating more resources to R&D search, we argue 
that CEOs with higher ownership power tend to shift the BOD’s attention to past successes of the 
firm and prevent their active involvement in decision making. They may emphasize the 
rightfulness of their previous choices by using tactics such as share buybacks (Benner & 
Ranganathan, 2012; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003) and demonstrate their confidence in current 
organizational strategies. Moreover, they could use their voting rights to enforce commitment to 
practices that have been shown to be successful, and persist with current R&D resource 
allocation decisions, since doing so could further enhance their authority (Haynes & Hillman, 
2010). We argue therefore that CEOs with significant ownership power tend to self-enhance 
when confronted with inconsistent feedback and to prevent potential losses to their socio-
economic wealth (George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005). They highlight past successes in order to 
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shift attention to positive assessments of the inconsistent feedback and present current actions to 
be aligned with the shareholder interests at the expense of R&D search. As such, we expect: 
Hypothesis 2: A greater inconsistency between positive performance feedback and 
negative performance prospects will result in less R&D search when the firm’s CEO has 
more ownership power. 
CEO expert power. Expert power helps CEOs to safeguard support from important 
constituents in their task environment (Finkelstein, 1992), which makes inconsistent feedback 
less threatening for them and for the firm. Indeed, the more CEOs interact with other 
stakeholders, the less important performance signals become in defining their relationship 
(Bunderson, 2003). This means that CEOs with a high level of expert power who have interacted 
extensively and have developed relationships with a variety of stakeholders are less dependent 
on positive assessment of firm performance in order to ensure mutual cooperation and 
commitment in the future (Choi & Wang, 2009). As such, CEOs with higher expert power may 
consider self-enhancement as less relevant or even counterproductive when dealing with 
inconsistent feedback because it may undermine established relationships with different 
stakeholders (Barney & Hansen, 1994). Using self-enhancement tendencies during evaluation 
processes could potentially damage stakeholder loyalty and put social relations, and thus the 
position of the CEO possessing expert power, at risk. We argue therefore that CEOs with high 
levels of expert power consider addressing problems and being transparent about R&D search as 
a way to negotiate a more favorable outcome for the firm by stressing that getting the firm back 
on track will be mutually beneficial. 
Furthermore, expert power helps CEOs to ensure the quality of information used when 
assessing inconsistent feedback and enhances their confidence in addressing shortcomings when 
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engaging in R&D search. Expert power enables CEOs to gain access to trustworthy and industry-
specific information through ties with important stakeholders from the task environment (Dyer & 
Chu, 2003; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Therefore, CEOs with expert power feel more 
confident about resolving debates with stakeholders following inconsistent feedback, and will 
therefore engage more readily in R&D search in order to take advantage of specific opportunities 
which can address negative parts of the inconsistent feedback and reverse the future prospects. In 
addition, CEOs with expert power have more hands-on experience (McDonald, Westphal, & 
Graebner, 2008) and tend to possess a more holistic understanding of difficult problems, which 
allows them to better estimate both the costs and benefits involved when pursuing problemistic 
search and solving problems associated with negative prospects (Park & Tzabbar, 2016). They 
feel better equipped to solve underlying problems associated with the inconsistent feedback 
because they have a better understanding of the potential of the opportunities identified. Thus, 
unlike CEOs with less expert power, whose firms invest less in R&D search to test the identified 
solution, those CEOs with expert power will have their firms to commit additional resources to 
R&D search in order to address the inconsistent feedback in a problem-solving way. 
Hypothesis 3: A greater inconsistency between positive performance feedback and 
negative performance prospects will result in more R&D search when the firm’s CEO 
has more expert power. 
CEO prestige power. Prestige power is often seen as an asset for CEOs because it 
provides access to scarce resources, high-quality information and advice from prestigious peers 
(Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008; Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, & Bresser, 2016). These 
benefits may assure prestigious CEOs that they are in control over the outcomes of debates and 
diverging opinions during the assessment of inconsistent feedback. Such CEOs tend to perceive 
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positive feedback and negative prospects as less challenging than less prestigious CEOs 
(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Sedikides & Strube, 1997), because they perceive the negative 
part of inconsistent feedback to be correctable. Suggestions about how to address inconsistent 
feedback made by CEOs with a high level of prestige power are also received more positively 
(Levine & Moreland, 1990), which provides prestigious CEOs with additional confirmation that 
the outcomes of R&D search will be regarded by others as useful and important to address 
negative prospects. They feel more capable to improve future performance by intensifying R&D 
search when confronted with inconsistent feedback than those with less prestige power. 
Prestigious CEOs are also more strongly motivated to safeguard their prestige (Marr & 
Thau, 2014). When they are faced with inconsistent feedback in which past success is recognized 
but future failure is anticipated, their motivation to protect their social standing is likely to be 
stronger because negative prospects reduce their status and prestige (Withers, Corley, & 
Hillman, 2012). More specifically, prestigious CEOs are part of an elite network, whose 
members want to preserve their exclusivity and status, which they do via monitoring and helping 
each other to ensure high standards of decision making (Acharya & Pollock, 2013; Davis, Yoo, 
& Baker, 2003). Constructing a favorable self-image in the event of inconsistent feedback can 
make CEOs seem dishonest or unreliable and may damage their social prestige (Cialdini & De 
Nicholas, 1989). We envision that such damage will be greater for prestigious CEOs because 
they are expected to demonstrate higher moral standards and to address potential drops in 
forward-looking prospects (Wang, Wezel, & Forgues, 2016). Thus, the higher the prestige power 
of CEOs, the more shifting attention away from future performance problems may put them at 
risk of losing their social standing. Rather, by addressing the problems underlying inconsistent 
feedback, they may protect their social standing (Krishnan & Kozhikode, 2015; Park & Podolny, 
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2000). Hence, we expect that decision makers at firms with prestigious CEOs will scrutinize 
inconsistent feedback, and intend to respond to it by increasing R&D search. 
Hypothesis 4: A greater inconsistency between positive performance feedback and 
negative performance prospects will result in more R&D search when the firm’s CEO 
has more prestige power. 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
Our initial sample consisted of all S&P 500 firms between 2002 and 2014. Data on firms 
and industries were collected from COMPUSTAT, CRSP and KLD, the data on CEOs, TMTs, 
BODs and investors from Execucomp, BoardEx and ISS, and the data on financial analysts’ 
forecasts, used to compute the performance prospects, from I/B/E/S. Following previous studies, 
we excluded firms within industries (i.e., based on four-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes) in which there were less than five competitors so as to limit the influence of a single 
firm on the computation of industry-level variables (Chen, 2008). Firms from financial services 
(SIC 60–69), utilities (SIC 40, 48 and 49) and unidentified industries (SIC 99) were also 
excluded. Finally, we left out firms whose R&D expenditure exceeded their sales, because such 
firms might be research firms and exhibit different investment behaviors (Chen, 2008). The final 
sample consisted of 241 firms and 1887 firm-year observations. 
Measures 
R&D search. Following earlier studies, we measured R&D search as the ratio of R&D 
spending to sales1 (Chen, 2008). Since firms are not required to report R&D spending which is 
                                                 
1Scholars have raised concerns about using ratios as dependent variables (Certo, Busenbark, Kalm, & LePine, 2018). 
We decided, however, to stick to previous operationalizations of R&D search as a ratio for two reasons. First, R&D 
intensity and R&D spending are two different theoretical constructs (Bromiley, Rau, & Zhang, 2017) and 
performance feedback affects each of these activities in completely opposite ways (Bromiley & Washburn, 2011). 
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less than ten percent of sales and general administrative expenses, we replaced non reported, e.g. 
missing, values for R&D spending with zero and included a dummy variable for missing R&D in 
our analysis to control for such replacement (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). To test the 
robustness of our measure, we employed alternative operationalizations of our dependent 
variable where R&D search was based only on non-missing values of R&D spending or captured 
by an index which also incorporated acquisition spending and capital expenditures (Iyer & 
Miller, 2008; Souder & Bromiley, 2012), and our results remained qualitatively the same. We 
elaborate on those robustness tests in the Results section. 
Inconsistency between performance feedback and performance prospects. We adopted 
the measures from Chen (2008) to compute performance feedback and performance prospects. 
Feedback was measured as the difference between past performance (t-1) and aspiration (t-1). 
We employed return on assets (ROA), i.e., the ratio of net income to total assets, as a measure of 
performance because it had been widely used in previous studies. Aspiration (t-1) was computed 
as a weighted combination of past performance at t-2 (weight of 0.6) and past performance at t-3 
(weight of 0.4), because firms tend to rely more heavily on recent performance measures when 
forming their aspirations (Chen, 2008). Prospects was measured as the difference between 
performance expectations (t+1) and current target (t). Financial analysts provide performance 
forecasts for firms, which are based on careful examination of the focal firm, its competitors and 
industry trends (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), and these forecasts have been used as an indicator of 
performance expectations (Chen, 2008). First, we took the average of the last earnings per share 
(EPS) forecast of each analyst who had issued forecasts for each firm for year t+1 in year t. We 
                                                 
Second, choosing R&D intensity allowed us to compare our results to many other studies concerned with the effect 
of performance feedback on R&D search (e.g., Chen, 2008; Lucas et al., 2018), and it was most closely aligned with 
the predictions of the BTOF (Bromiley & Washburn, 2011). 
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then computed the expected ROA t+1 by multiplying the average forecasted EPS t+1 by the 
shares outstanding and dividing it by the total assets. Target was computed in a way that 
reflected the notion that decision makers develop targets based on a historical time series of 
performance trends (Chen, 2008). As such, current target was the predicted ROA t after ROA t 
had been regressed on past ROA from time t-1 to t-3 (Chen, 2008). 
We then separated the performance assessment effects into negative and positive (Chen, 
2008). Negative feedback was the absolute difference between the firm’s past performance and 
aspiration when the performance was below the aspiration, and zero otherwise. Positive feedback 
was the absolute difference between the firm’s past performance and aspiration when the 
performance was above the aspiration, and zero otherwise. Negative prospects was the absolute 
difference between the firm’s future performance expectation and current target when the 
performance expectations were below the target, and zero otherwise. Positive prospects was the 
absolute difference between the firm’s future performance expectation and current target when 
the performance expectations were above the target, and zero otherwise. As such, higher values 
for the negative feedback/prospects indicated more negative values and higher values for the 
positive feedback/prospects indicated more positive values. All four feedback and prospect 
variables were winsorized at the 0.5%-level to avoid some extreme outliers and enable us to still 
keep the observations as part of our sample. The effect of inconsistent feedback in the case of 
negative prospects and positive feedback was studied by including an interaction term between 
the two variables. We also controlled for the alternative scenario of inconsistency between 
positive prospects and negative feedback by including a second interaction term. 
CEO structural power. We measured CEO structural power as an index of the sum of 
four standardized components, namely (1) CEO duality, measured as one if the CEO also served 
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as the chair of the BOD, and zero otherwise, (2) the number of non-CEO TMT members, who sat 
on the BOD (reversed) (3), title inequality and (4) pay inequality (Daily & Johnson, 1997; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Patel & Cooper, 2014). Title was a count measure based on information 
available in Execucomp about the different titles that each TMT member held. Pay was the 
natural logarithm of total compensation received by each TMT member; tdc1 variable from 
Execucomp was used for total compensation. Inequality was measured as: 
(∑
(𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆𝑗)
2
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
1/2
 
where 𝑆𝑖 was the CEO’s titles/pay, 𝑆𝑗 was the title/pay of non-CEO TMT member j, and n 
was the number of non-CEO TMT members. Following other studies, we considered TMT 
members, including the CEO, to be the five highest paid executives within the firm (e.g., Ridge, 
Aime, & White, 2015). 
CEO ownership power. We measured CEO ownership power as an index of the sum of 
two standardized components, namely (1) whether the CEO was a founder of the firm, coded as 
one if the CEO was, and zero otherwise, and (2) the CEO ownership percentage as a proportion 
of the summed ownership percentage of outside directors and institutional block-holder 
investors, namely institutional investors who owned at least five percent of the total firm stock 
(Canella & Shen, 2001; Finkelstein, 1992). 
CEO expert power. CEO expert power was measured as an index of the sum of three 
standardized components, namely (1) CEO tenure in the firm, (2) the number of roles that the 
CEO had in the firm, and (3) the number of functional areas in which the CEO had served the 
firm (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992). We used previously identified functional areas: 
(a) production and operations, (b) R&D and engineering, (c) accounting and finance, (d) 
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management and administration, (e) marketing and sales, (f) law, (g) personnel and labor 
relations (Patel & Cooper, 2014). 
CEO prestige power. We measured CEO prestige power as an index of the sum of three 
standardized components, namely (1) the number of public boards the CEO sat on, (2) the 
number of non-profit boards the CEO sat on, and (3) whether the CEO had an elite education, 
which was coded as one if the CEO had a degree from an elite institution, and zero otherwise 
(Finkelstein, 1992). The list of elite institutions was adopted from Gomulya and Boeker (2014). 
Control variables. We included several variables for firms, CEOs, BODs, industries and 
time that could have an effect on R&D search and/or the performance feedback and prospects 
variables. We included a lagged dependent variable, which allowed us to capture the effects of 
routine planned investments (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). It also helped us to cope with 
autocorrelation in the error term. Other firm control variables were firm size, which could affect 
the firm’s capabilities and preferences for investments, and firm growth, based on sales growth 
over the past three years, which could shift perceptions regarding the benefits of R&D intensity. 
We also included financial slack, measured by an index composed of two firm-standardized 
ratios: current assets to current liabilities, and working capital to sales (Chen, 2008). 
We further controlled for alternative uses of cash such as firm dividends per share (DPS) 
and share repurchases (the natural logarithm of the value of purchase of common and preferred 
stock), which could affect decisions about R&D search (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). We also 
included a measure of earnings management based on discretionary accruals, which could be 
used to boost short-term results (Zang, 2011). Earnings management was based on a modified 
Jones (1991) model run for each year-industry combination, and it was proxied by the residual 
from regressing total accruals (being the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
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operations minus operating cash flows) on the change in revenues from the preceding year and 
the gross value of property, plant and equipment, all scaled by firm total assets (Zang, 2011). 
To allow us to better isolate the effect of CEO expert power and CEO prestige power, we 
also controlled for firm reputation among stakeholders and firm status. To compute firm 
reputation with stakeholders we used data from KLD. We standardized the number of strengths 
and concerns on six dimensions and subtracted the total number of concerns from the total 
number of strengths to derive the reputation with stakeholders index (Choi & Wang, 2009). The 
six dimensions were community relations, employee relations, diversity, human rights, 
environment, and product. To proxy for firm status, we used the residual from regressing analyst 
coverage, which was the natural logarithm of the number of financial analysts providing 
forecasts for the focal firm for a particular fiscal year, on established predictors from previous 
research. The predictors we used in the regression were firm size (natural logarithm of total 
assets), ROA, returns volatility (standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year) and 
cumulative stock returns of the firm over the fiscal year (Shen, Tang, & Chen, 2014). 
We controlled for CEO age and gender. We also included CEO overconfidence 
employing a measure based on CEO option exercise behavior. Research has shown that CEOs 
sell exercisable options when they are not confident about the future prospects of the firm 
(Devers, McNamara, Haleblian, & Yoder, 2013). We therefore classified CEOs as overconfident 
if they had kept their exercisable stock options when the stock price was at least 67% higher than 
the exercisable price at least twice in the period from the beginning of their tenure as CEO until 
the focal year (Chen et al., 2015; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). We also included the CEO long-
term pay mix, being the proportion of total compensation paid in long-term forms such as long-
term incentive plans, stock options and restricted stock (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Some 
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important board-related variables, which could be consequential for board monitoring and thus 
for opportunities to self-enhance, were board size (the logarithm of the number of directors) and 
board independence (the proportion of independent directors) (Desai, 2016). 
We also controlled for the median industry R&D search (Chen, 2008), industry-based 
managerial discretion (Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015) and environmental uncertainty (Arrfelt et 
al., 2013). Managerial discretion was an index of the sum of four standardized components based 
on four-digit industry SIC codes, namely (1), average industry capital intensity, being the net 
value of property, plant and equipment divided by the firm total assets (reversed) (2), average 
industry advertising intensity, being the advertising expenses divided by sales (3) industry 
munificence, and (4) industry concentration (reversed) (Chen et al., 2015). Industry munificence 
was operationalized by first regressing time against industry sales for a five-year period 
preceding the year of interest, and then scaling the regression coefficient by the average industry 
sales used in the regression. Industry competitiveness was measured via the Herfindahl index. 
Environmental uncertainty was measured by the standard error of the regression coefficient of 
time instead of the coefficient itself (Arrfelt et al., 2013). 
Time effects, i.e., year dummies, were included to control for macroenvironmental 
changes that may affect the whole panel of firms. The estimation method also controlled for firm 
fixed effects. All independent, moderator and control variables were lagged one year, except for 
prospects, missing R&D, share repurchases, and earnings management. Moreover, all 
independent and moderator variables were centered to prevent multicollinearity. 
Analysis 
Due to the correlation between the unobserved fixed effects and the lagged dependent 
variable, the inclusion of past values of R&D search made standard estimators inconsistent. 
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Arellano and Bond (1991) derived a consistent generalized method-of-moments estimator, 
appropriate for use in such cases. We therefore used the Arellano–Bond dynamic panel 
estimator. We treated all predictors in the model as endogenous and estimated them by means of 
instrumental variables, using past values of the regressors as instruments. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the study variables. Table 2 
presents the results of the Arellano–Bond one-step estimator for R&D search. All variance 
inflation factors were less than 5.07, meaning that multicollinearity was not a problem for 
interpreting the results. In all models, the assumptions of the Arellano–Bond estimator were met. 
Namely, no second-order autocorrelation was present, since the AR(2) tests for all models were 
not significant. The instruments used were valid; they were correlated with the endogenous 
variables but not with the error terms, as indicated by the non-significance of the Hansen and the 
difference-in-Hansen tests. The chi-square statistic for all models was significant. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Model 1 in Table 2 presents the base model, which included the interaction term of 
negative prospects and positive feedback, representing the effect of inconsistent feedback on 
R&D search. It also included all the direct effects of prospects and feedback, the moderators and 
control variables, as well as the alternative interaction term of positive prospects and negative 
feedback, for which we controlled. Several variables were significant in Model 1. The coefficient 
of CEO structural power was negative and significant (b = -0.003, p < .01). The coefficients of 
financial slack (b = 0.10, p < .05) and industry R&D search (b = 1.36, p < .00) were both positive 
and significant. The interaction term of positive prospects and negative feedback, the alternative 
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scenario of inconsistent feedback, was negative and significant (b = -6.45, p < .05), which is 
consistent with the findings of Chen (2008). On average, the firms in our sample engaged in less 
R&D search when past performance was unsatisfactory but future prospects seemed good, 
meaning that they engaged more in self-enhancement in this specific scenario. More negative 
feedback (by 1 SD = 0.04) resulted in 0.012 less R&D search when firms experienced more 
positive prospects (+1 SD = 0.04) and 0.008 more R&D search when they experienced less 
positive prospects (-1 SD = -0.04). 
The interaction term of negative prospects and positive feedback, our main variable of 
inconsistent feedback, was positive and significant (b = 66.95, p < .01). This meant that on 
average, decision makers in our sample engaged in more problem-solving and invested more in 
R&D search when past performance was good but they anticipated performance shortfalls. More 
negative prospects (by 1 SD = 0.01) resulted in 0.057 more R&D search when firms experienced 
more positive feedback (+1 SD = 0.04) and only 0.004 more R&D search when they experienced 
less positive feedback (- 1 SD = -0.04). The difference of 0.053 in expected R&D search as a 
result of a change in the negativity of firm prospects when the past feedback was less versus 
more positive could serve as a baseline when studying the impact of our contingency variables. 
Hypothesis Testing 
We added the three-way interactions and the required two-way interactions between 
negative prospects, positive feedback and the moderators, i.e., CEO structural power, CEO 
ownership power, CEO expert power, and CEO prestige power in Models 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively. We controlled for the effect of the alternative scenario of inconsistent feedback, i.e., 
positive prospects and negative feedback, which we further discuss in our supplementary 
analysis. Moreover, we present a full model with all three-way interactions for completeness in 
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Model 6. Nevertheless, we use the partial models for testing our hypotheses because of inherent 
challenges of interpretation and statistical power as well as multicollinearity when all three- and 
two-way interaction terms are included in an estimation model.  
The coefficient for the three-way interaction between negative prospects, positive 
feedback, and CEO structural power was negative and significant (Model 2, b = -23.30, p < .05), 
supporting Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for the three-way interaction between negative 
prospects, positive feedback, and CEO ownership power was negative and significant (Model 3, 
b = -56.88, p < .05), supporting Hypothesis 2. The coefficient for the three-way interaction 
between negative prospects, positive feedback, and CEO expert power was significant but 
negative (Model 4, b = -15.29, p < .05), which indicated that more inconsistent positive feedback 
and negative prospects resulted in more R&D search when the firm’s CEO had less rather than 
more expert power, which is the opposite of what we predicted. Hypothesis 3 was therefore 
rejected. The coefficient for the three-way interaction between negative prospects, positive 
feedback, and CEO prestige power was positive and significant (Model 5, b = 45.86, p < .01), 
supporting Hypothesis 4. 
Interaction Plots and Effect Sizes 
Figures 2 to 5 depict the three-way interactions in which we plotted the slopes of negative 
prospects in the range of one SD below and above the mean. Figure 2 shows that CEOs with low 
structural power increased R&D search more when the negative prospects and positive feedback 
became more inconsistent, i.e., when the positive feedback shifted from less to more positive 
(simple slope difference t = 2.77, p < .01), compared to CEOs with high structural power for 
whom the shift did not make a difference (simple slope difference t = 1.10, n.s.). When negative 
prospects dropped by one SD, CEOs with low structural power increased R&D search by 0.065 
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if they faced more positive feedback (b = 6.48, p < .001) but made no significant changes if the 
feedback was less positive (b = -0.60, n.s.). In comparison to the baseline difference of 0.053 (as 
calculated before), 0.065 represented a 22.6% further increase in the expected R&D search as a 
result of the growing inconsistency between positive feedback and negative prospects when 
CEOs had little structural power. Even though the difference between slopes of negative 
prospects and less versus more positive feedback was not statistically different for structurally 
powerful CEOs, it is worth mentioning that the slope of negative prospects and more positive 
feedback was positive and significant (b = 3.40, p < .01), while the slope of negative prospects 
and the less positive feedback was not significant (b = 1.49, n.s.). 
Figure 3 shows that CEOs with low ownership power invested more in R&D search when 
the negative prospects and positive feedback became more inconsistent (simple slope difference t 
= 2.73, p < .01) compared to CEOs with high ownership power for whom the shift did not make 
a difference (simple slope difference t = 0.52, n.s.). When negative prospects dropped by one 
SD, CEOs with low ownership power increased R&D search by 0.061 if they faced more 
positive feedback (b = 6.07, p < .01) but made no significant changes if the feedback was less 
positive (b = -1.87, n.s.). In comparison to the baseline relationship, 0.061 represented 15.1% 
increase in the expected R&D search as a result of greater inconsistency between positive 
feedback and negative prospects when CEOs had less ownership power. 
Figure 4 shows that CEOs with low expert power increased R&D search more when the 
negative prospects and positive feedback became more inconsistent (simple slope difference t = 
2.84, p < .01) compared to CEOs with high expert power for whom the shift was not significant 
(simple slope difference t = 0.36, n.s.). When negative prospects dropped by one SD, non-expert 
CEOs increased R&D search by 0.056 if they faced more positive feedback (b = 5.58, p < .001) 
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but made no changes if the feedback was less positive (b = -0.31, n.s.). In comparison to the 
baseline effect, 0.056 represented 5.7% increase in the expected R&D search as a result of the 
rising inconsistency between positive feedback and negative prospects when CEOs had less 
expert power. When negative prospects dropped by one SD, CEOs with expert power increased 
R&D search by only 0.028 if they faced more positive feedback (b = 2.80, p < .01) and slightly 
less if the feedback was less positive (b = 2.33, p < .10), yet the difference was minimal. 
Lastly, Figure 5 shows that CEOs with high prestige power invested more in R&D search 
when the negative prospects and positive feedback became more inconsistent (simple slope 
difference t = 3.80, p < .001) compared to CEOs with low prestige power for whom the shift was 
not significant (simple slope difference t = -0.68, n.s.). When negative prospects dropped by one 
SD, prestigious CEOs increased R&D search by 0.078 if they faced more positive feedback (b = 
7.75, p < .001) but made no significant changes if the feedback was less positive (b = -2.10, n.s.). 
CEO prestige power thus boosted the baseline difference of the expected R&D search by 47.2% 
when the positive feedback and negative prospects became more inconsistent. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Post-Hoc Analysis of the Moderating Effect of CEO Expert Power 
We conducted a post-hoc analysis to test some alternative explanations with regards to 
the surprising finding that CEO expert power had affected the relationship between positive 
feedback, negative prospects, and R&D search in the opposite way to what we had expected. 
First, we tested whether the different components reflecting CEO expert power show diverging 
effects on the relationship between inconsistent feedback and R&D search. To do that, we tested 
the moderating effects of the three components of CEO expert power separately on the 
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relationship of between inconsistent positive feedback and negative prospects, and R&D search. 
Our models, however, showed that the three components of CEO expert power demonstrated 
consistent moderation effects, namely the coefficients of the three-way interactions with CEO 
tenure in the firm (b = -4.39, p < .01) and the number CEO functions in the firm (b = -26.23, p < 
.05) were negative and significant albeit slightly weaker for the number CEO roles in the firm (b 
= -6.64, p < .10). 
Second, we examined whether what shapes the CEO’s expert power in dealing with 
inconsistent feedback and engaging in more R&D search is not associated with the number of 
close relationships with stakeholders in general but rather with specific groups of stakeholders in 
particular. For example, CEOs who have performed a sales and marketing function might have a 
better understanding of important customers and have developed trusting relationships with 
them, which could provide access to information about the market or competitive offerings 
(Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, & Matthyssens, 2011). To examine this alternative explanation, we 
created seven dummies corresponding to the seven functional domains of the CEO within the 
firm. Each dummy took the value of one if the CEO had performed it, and zero otherwise, except 
for the management and administration function, which was one when the CEO had performed 
only that function within the firm, and zero otherwise. Controlling for expertise power, we ran 
seven different models in which we added to Model 1 the three-way interactions between 
negative prospects, positive feedback, and each of the dummy function variables. Only the three-
way interaction with the marketing and sales dummy was positive and significant (b = 108.01, p 
< .001). The other three-way interactions were negative and significant, i.e., the one with the 
management and administration only dummy (b = -94.77, p < .001), and the ones with the 
production-operations dummy (b = -99.30, p < .001), accounting and finance dummy (b = -
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76.93, p < .01), law function (b = -65.88, p < .05), and personnel and labor relations dummy (b = 
-98.13, p < .01), except for the R&D and engineering dummy, which was just marginally 
significant (b = -46.69, p < .10). The post-hoc analysis suggests that only CEOs who have sales 
and marketing background invest more in R&D search when faced with more divergent negative 
prospects coupled with past success. Although these findings indicate the importance of 
considering specific functional domains in which CEOs have expert power, results should be 
regarded with caution because some functions were under-represented in our sample. 
Robustness Checks 
We performed several robustness checks with an alternative configuration of inconsistent 
feedback, (sub)samples and a different dependent variable. The results are available on request. 
Alternative configuration of inconsistent feedback. The interaction effects of the 
alternative configuration of inconsistent feedback, negative feedback and positive prospects, 
were not significant for the contingency variables in our study. That is, the three-way interactions 
with CEO structural power (Model 2, b = 0.47, n.s.), CEO ownership power (Model 3, b = 1.47, 
n.s.), CEO expert power (Model 4, b = -0.26, n.s.), and CEO prestige power (Model 5, b = 1.43, 
n.s.) were not significant. An interesting observation emerged though in terms of effect signs. 
CEO structural and ownership power had an opposite impact in terms of how the alternative 
configuration of inconsistent feedback – i.e., negative feedback but positive prospects – affected 
R&D search, because the signs of the three-way interactions were positive rather than negative. 
In addition, CEO expert and prestige power seemed to have a similar impact on the effect of both 
configurations of inconsistent firm’s past feedback and future prospects on R&D search. 
Alternative (sub)samples. First, although we restricted our main sample to firms within 
four-digit SIC industries with a minimum of five competitors, findings remained consistent when 
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we included firms from industries with fewer than five competitors (N = 1921). Second, we 
assumed that missing values of R&D were zero, and replaced them accordingly. Including firms 
that explicitly reported their R&D spending and excluding ones that did not, produced the same 
results (N = 1387). Lastly, many studies that are based on the BTOF have considered only 
manufacturing firms (SIC 2000–3999). We did the same, running our analysis on a subsample of 
S&P 500 firms from manufacturing industries only and our results did not change (N = 1057). 
Alternative dependent variable. Given the variety of industries represented in our sample, 
we allowed for the possibility that the firms might have engaged in problemistic search with 
different types of investment. Thus, we composed an index by standardizing and summing three 
types of search investment, which have been found relevant in previous studies – i.e., R&D 
spending, capital spending and acquisition spending (all scaled by sales) (Iyer & Miller, 2008; 
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Souder & Bromiley, 2012). Findings based on this alternative 
dependent variable show consistent results (N = 1887). 
DISCUSSION 
We built a contingent model to examine how CEOs acted upon a growing inconsistency 
between negative prospects and positive feedback. While firms on average increased R&D 
search when the positive backward-looking feedback and the negative forward-looking prospects 
became more inconsistent, different source of CEO power greatly affected such tendencies. We 
found that CEOs engaged in more self-enhancement and less R&D search when they had more 
structural power or ownership power. In contrast, CEOs with a high level of prestige power acted 
as problem-solvers and engaged in more R&D search after receiving more inconsistent feedback. 
Even though we anticipated that expert power would encourage CEOs to make more problem-
solving attempts when dealing with inconsistent feedback, we found the opposite result. Our 
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post-hoc analysis revealed that only CEOs who had developed expertise in marketing and sales 
within the firm increased R&D search when feedback became more inconsistent. Overall, these 
findings suggest important implications, and suggest avenues for future research. 
Theoretical Implications 
Our theory advances research on how decision makers deal with inconsistent feedback 
(Audia & Brion, 2007; Joseph & Gaba, 2015). Although earlier research has explicated two 
decision rules, i.e. self-enhancement and problem-solving (Audia & Brion, 2007; Baum et al., 
2005; Hu et al., 2017; Joseph & Gaba, 2015; Lucas et al., 2018), empirical evidence about which 
decision rule prevails during the assessment of inconsistent feedback has been inconclusive. Our 
study provides an important first attempt to reconcile disparate theoretical perspectives by 
examining when problem-solving or self-enhancing tendencies surface when responding to 
inconsistent feedback. We provide important implications for our understanding about the 
conditions under which decision-makers may increase or reduce R&D search when receiving 
positive performance feedback and negative prospects. 
Our findings forward research on the intersection between the BTOF and self-
enhancement theory (Jordan & Audia, 2012) by revealing that different types of CEO power 
provoke specific dynamics between the CEO and different stakeholders during the assessment of 
inconsistent feedback. Importantly, we reveal that higher levels of structural and ownership 
power serve as a tool for promoting self-enhancing assessment of inconsistent feedback (Fang et 
al., 2014; Lim, 2015; Desai, 2016), yet our findings also suggest that CEO prestige power 
promotes problem-solving behaviors during the assessment of inconsistent feedback. Overall, 
thus, our findings imply that ‘harsh’ or ‘control’ categories of CEO power are not instrumental to 
resolve performance-related problems, because they shift the preferences of CEOs towards 
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prioritizing their personal interests and self-enhancement. However, ‘soft’ or ‘persuasive’ 
categories of CEO power ensure support, loyalty and commitment from other stakeholders, 
which makes CEOs more confident to consider mutually beneficial outcomes when confronted 
with inconsistent feedback and show preference for problem-solving. 
Our non-finding and post-hoc analysis with respect to the contingency effect of CEO 
expert power have important implications for research on decision making within the upper 
echelons (Bunderson, 2003; Buyl et al., 2011). First, only a few scholars have touched upon the 
implications of making a distinction between generalist and specialist CEOs for strategic 
decision making, and even fewer have considered specific functional expertise (e.g., Kor & 
Misangyi, 2008; Merluzzi & Phillips, 2016). Our unexpected finding that CEOs’ function-based 
expertise provides more useful insights about how firms respond to inconsistent feedback than 
more broadly defined firm-specific expertise, implies that scholars studying this phenomenon in 
the context of CEOs, TMTs and directors should pay closer attention to the former type of 
expertise rather than the latter. Second, our post-hoc findings imply that scholars interested in 
how TMT functional diversity affects decision making could benefit from understanding better 
which specific functions are over- or under-represented within TMTs, rather than focusing on the 
level of diversity per se. 
Our empirical findings also advance research on the consequences of forward- and 
backward-looking performance assessments (Chen, 2008; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). For 
instance, scholars have suggested that forward- and backward-looking performance assessments 
might be equally important in driving search behavior and organizational change (Chen, 2008; 
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). Our findings that decision makers increased R&D search more when 
faced with positive feedback and negative prospects but decreased it when feedback was 
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negative and prospects were positive imply that decision makers seem to pay greater attention to 
forward- rather than backward-looking performance assessments. This implies that scholars 
should pay greater attention to the consequences of performance expectations for strategic 
decision making. Finally, while scholars have suggested that the inconsistent feedback 
configuration might matter for how decision makers respond to it (Lucas et al., 2018), most 
studies have focused on backward-looking feedback contradictions. Our findings extend 
previous knowledge and suggest that scholars interested in how decision makers respond to 
inconsistencies between forward- and backward-looking performance assessments should 
consider their configuration because responses in this specific context vary. 
Practical Implications 
Our findings have important implications for corporate governance. Our results show that 
CEOs with less structural power invested 22.6% more in R&D search when the feedback became 
more inconsistent, and those with less ownership power, increased their investment by 15.1%. 
This implies that external monitoring bodies could pay more attention to CEOs’ decisions about 
R&D search when the CEO has more structural or ownership power. In addition, if firms want to 
boost R&D search in response to more inconsistent feedback, our research advises hiring CEOs 
with degrees from prestigious universities or CEOs who sit on multiple boards since they 
invested 47.2% more upon higher feedback inconsistency. Alternatively, BODs could support 
less prestigious CEOs to ensure they will be more responsive to inconsistencies in feedback. 
Lastly, CEOs who lack expertise in sales and marketing could be an alarm bell for firms for 
which high levels of R&D search are essential. In such cases, other TMT members and directors 
could provide assistance to such CEOs so as to prevent insufficient resources being allocated to 
R&D search when forward- and backward-looking performance signals are inconsistent. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Our study is not without its limitations, which though could provide fruitful directions for 
future research. First, a logical assumption which we did not draw on in our paper, is that 
multiple sources of power over the same stakeholder may coexist (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). 
Thus, future research could investigate how specific sources of power between the same 
coalition members combine to affect decision making. Second, we found expert power to have a 
negative effect on the CEO’s propensity to problem-solve when dealing with inconsistent 
feedback, yet most studies have looked at the benefits of such a persuasive type of power for 
decision making (Peiró & Meliá, 2003). Thus it is important to determine which sources of soft 
power between different parties have a negative impact on decision making, and under what 
circumstances. Third, we did not consider that the four sources of CEO power might work as 
substitutes or complements (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), but we believe that using a 
configurational approach such as qualitative comparative case analysis could be very useful to 
advance the theory further. Lastly, our findings based on the two configurations of inconsistent 
feedback that CEO power shifts problem-solving but not self-enhancing tendencies when dealing 
with inconsistent feedback urges scholars to investigate how self-enhancing could be offset. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we unpack the various ways in which decision makers responded to 
inconsistent feedback by engaging in either problem-solving or self-enhancement tendencies. 
Focusing on four sources of CEO power, we explained how power dynamics between the CEO 
and important stakeholders impacted R&D search. We hope that our findings inspire more 
governance research on how stakeholders such as TMT members or BODs interact and influence 
each other when they are making decisions following inconsistent feedback.
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. R&D search 0.05 0.09 1.00 
               
2. Negative feedback 0.02 0.04 0.19 1.00 
              
3. Positive feedback 0.02 0.04 0.16 -0.21 1.00 
             
4. Negative prospects 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 1.00 
            
5. Positive prospects 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.08 0.05 -0.40 1.00 
           
6. CEO structural power 0.91 §2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 1.00 
          
7. CEO ownership power 0.04 0.83 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.05 1.00 
         
8. CEO expert power 0.22 2.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
        
9. CEO prestige power 0.58 1.62 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.08 1.00 
       
10. Firm size 8.99 1.21 -0.09 0.01 -0.06 -0.14 -0.06 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.16 1.00 
      
11. Firm growth 0.37 0.57 0.14 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.13 0.01 -0.05 1.00 
     
12. Financial slack  -0.44 0.32 0.47 0.07 0.13 -0.08 0.35 -0.07 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.29 0.20 1.00 
    
13. Firm DPS 0.63 0.68 -0.21 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.18 -0.09 0.28 0.10 0.44 -0.22 -0.23 1.00 
   
14. Firm share repurchases 4.57 2.81 0.05 -0.14 -0.04 -0.27 0.28 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.37 -0.07 -0.01 0.20 1.00 
  
15. Firm earnings management 0.01 0.07 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 1.00 
 
16. Firm stakeholder reputation 0.42 4.62 0.24 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 0.13 0.11 -0.03 0.14 0.05 0.04 -0.10 0.11 0.11 0.18 -0.03 1.00 
 
17. Firm status 0.15 0.47 0.24 0.16 -0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.18 -0.20 -0.04 -0.22 0.06 1.00 
18. CEO age 55.63 6.12 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.14 -0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
19. CEO gender 0.01 0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.01 
20. CEO overconfidence 0.46 0.50 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.18 0.17 0.15 -0.19 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 0.12 
21. CEO long-term pay mix 0.76 0.20 0.08 0.05 0.00 -0.18 0.11 0.28 -0.04 0.06 0.13 0.19 -0.08 0.01 0.16 0.18 -0.01 0.15 0.00 
22. Board size 2.26 0.23 -0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.18 0.08 0.48 -0.08 -0.28 0.32 0.24 0.01 0.05 -0.10 
23. Board independence 91.46 8.10 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.28 -0.16 0.03 0.04 0.20 -0.02 -0.15 0.17 0.08 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 
24. Industry R&D search 0.04 0.07 0.74 0.16 0.14 -0.08 0.31 -0.02 0.08 -0.11 0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.47 -0.25 0.12 -0.14 0.28 0.22 
25. Managerial discretion -0.09 1.89 0.28 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.15 -0.05 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.13 -0.01 0.20 0.08 0.20 -0.03 
26. Environmental uncertainty 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.20 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 
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TABLE 1 
(continued) 
  18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
19. CEO gender -0.01 1.00      
20. CEO overconfidence 0.22 -0.01 1.00     
21. CEO long-term pay mix 0.03 0.02 0.00 1.00    
22. Board size 0.07 0.00 -0.24 0.11 1.00   
23. Board independence 0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.14 -0.01 1.00  
24. Industry R&D search -0.16 -0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.13 -0.03 1.00  
25. Managerial discretion -0.13 0.03 -0.11 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.31 1.00 
26. Environmental uncertainty 0.09 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.33 
Note: N = 1887. All correlations greater than |0.03| are significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 2 
Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Regression Results Predicting R&D Search 
Variables  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Negative prospects X Positive feedback X 
CEO structural power 
H1     -23.296 *             -10.308   
   
(10.625) 
       
(10.879) 
 
Positive feedback X CEO structural power 
   
-0.160 
       
-0.105 
 
   
(0.104) 
       
(0.092) 
 
Negative prospects X CEO structural 
power 
   
-0.212 ** 
      
-0.103 
 
   
(0.080) 
       
(0.064) 
 
Negative prospects X Positive feedback X 
CEO ownership power 
H2 
    
-56.875 * 
    
-30.032 
 
     
(28.211) 
     
(25.058) 
 
Positive feedback X CEO ownership 
power 
     
-0.592 ** 
    
-0.418 †      
(0.216) 
     
(0.222) 
 
Negative prospects X CEO ownership 
power 
     
0.218 
     
0.433 
 
     
(1.137) 
     
(1.210) 
 
Negative prospects X Positive feedback X 
CEO expert power 
H3 
      
-15.287 * 
  
-10.265 *        
(5.984) 
   
(4.559) 
 
Positive feedback X CEO expert power 
       
-0.124 † 
  
-0.092 *        
(0.069) 
   
(0.046) 
 
Negative prospects X CEO expert power 
       
-0.016 
   
-0.155 
 
       
(0.162) 
   
(0.184) 
 
Negative prospects X Positive feedback X 
CEO prestige power 
H4 
        
45.862 ** 37.627 **          
(16.036) 
 
(13.371) 
 
Positive feedback X CEO prestige power 
         
0.489 ** 0.408 **          
(0.162) 
 
(0.133) 
 
Negative prospects X CEO prestige power 
         
0.339 
 
0.243 
 
         
(0.346) 
 
(0.281) 
 
Negative prospects X Positive feedback 
 
66.950 ** 57.272 ** 58.060 ** 42.237 * 56.704 *** 34.639 **  
(23.934) 
 
(21.726) 
 
(20.171) 
 
(18.125) 
 
(16.121) 
 
(11.895) 
 
CEO structural power 
 
-0.003 ** -0.004 † -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.002 * -0.003 *  
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CEO ownership power 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.009) 
 
CEO expert power 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
CEO prestige power 
 
0.007 
 
0.006 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
0.009 † 0.003 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
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TABLE 2 
(continued) 
Variables  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Negative feedback X Positive prospects X 
CEO structural power 
   
0.470 
       
0.152 
 
   
(1.251) 
       
(0.952) 
 
Positive prospects X CEO structural power 
   
-0.221 ** 
      
-0.171 **    
(0.073) 
       
(0.061) 
 
Negative feedback X CEO structural power 
   
0.004 
       
-0.025 
 
   
(0.062) 
       
(0.034) 
 
Negative feedback X Positive prospects X 
CEO ownership power 
     
1.466 
     
0.590 
 
     
(1.599) 
     
(1.299) 
 
Positive prospects X CEO ownership power 
     
-0.022 
     
0.024 
 
     
(0.043) 
     
(0.039) 
 
Negative feedback X CEO ownership power 
     
-0.093 
     
-0.043 
 
     
(0.166) 
     
(0.132) 
 
Negative feedback X Positive prospects X 
CEO expert power 
       
-0.256 
   
0.148 
 
       
(0.541) 
   
(0.439) 
 
Positive prospects X CEO expert power 
       
0.132 ** 
  
0.086 *        
(0.046) 
   
(0.039) 
 
Negative feedback X CEO expert power 
       
0.012 
   
-0.032 
 
       
(0.048) 
   
(0.032) 
 
Negative feedback X Positive prospects X 
CEO prestige power 
         
1.428 
 
0.755 
 
         
(2.568) 
 
(2.609) 
 
Positive prospects X CEO prestige power 
         
-0.016 
 
-0.039 
 
         
(0.061) 
 
(0.046) 
 
Negative feedback X CEO prestige power 
         
0.095 
 
0.094 
 
         
(0.095) 
 
(0.073) 
 
Negative feedback X Positive prospects 
 
-6.487 * -4.939 † -5.814 * -4.691 † -5.622 * -3.433 
 
 
(2.961) 
 
(2.702) 
 
(2.789) 
 
(2.818) 
 
(2.454) 
 
(2.275) 
 
Negative feedback 
 
-0.051 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.095 
 
-0.063 
 
-0.032 
 
 
(0.173) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.100) 
 
Positive feedback 
 
0.278 
 
0.132 
 
0.207 
 
0.033 
 
0.204 
 
0.007 
 
 
(0.256) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.122) 
 
Negative prospects 
 
3.069 ** 2.600 ** 2.281 ** 2.599 ** 2.277 * 1.350 *  
(0.995) 
 
(0.871) 
 
(0.738) 
 
(0.922) 
 
(0.920) 
 
(0.580) 
 
Positive prospects 
 
-0.493 ** -0.587 *** -0.518 ** -0.518 ** -0.479 ** -0.542 ***  
(0.159) 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.148) 
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TABLE 2 
(continued) 
Variables  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
R&D intensity t-1 
 
0.199 † 0.159 
 
0.194 
 
0.138 
 
0.175 
 
0.066 
 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.130) 
 
Missing R&D dummy 
 
0.099 † 0.051 
 
0.051 
 
0.072 
 
0.086 * 0.016 
 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Firm size 
 
0.031 
 
0.022 
 
0.024 
 
0.030 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Firm growth 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.004 
 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.007) 
 
Financial slack  
 
0.101 * 0.117 * 0.100 * 0.086 * 0.082 * 0.081 **  
(0.051) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Firm DPS 
 
0.010 
 
-0.004 
 
0.007 
 
-0.003 
 
0.005 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.007) 
 
Firm share repurchases 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
Firm earnings management 
 
0.005 
 
0.016 
 
-0.004 
 
0.016 
 
0.017 
 
0.005 
 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.060) 
 
Firm stakeholder reputation 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 †  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
Firm status 
 
0.007 
 
0.007 
 
0.009 
 
0.004 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.001 
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
CEO age 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
CEO gender 
 
0.001 
 
0.011 
 
-0.003 
 
0.038 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.003 
 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.031) 
 
CEO overconfidence 
 
0.002 
 
0.007 
 
0.007 
 
0.007 
 
0.001 
 
0.012 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.008) 
 
CEO long-term pay mix 
 
0.045 
 
0.035 
 
0.025 
 
0.011 
 
0.013 
 
0.006 
 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Board size 
 
0.055 
 
0.060 † 0.061 * 0.054 
 
0.054 † 0.045 *  
(0.038) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Board independence 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Industry R&D search 
 
1.363 *** 1.293 *** 1.180 ** 1.060 ** 1.017 ** 0.623 *  
(0.383) 
 
(0.366) 
 
(0.354) 
 
(0.340) 
 
(0.330) 
 
(0.249) 
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TABLE 2 
(continued) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Managerial discretion  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.003  
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  
Environmental uncertainty  0.268  0.118  0.238  0.166  0.289  0.005  
 (0.230)  (0.211)  (0.207)  (0.218)  (0.208)  (0.170)  
Intercept  -0.450  -0.343  -0.346  -0.442  -0.171  -0.075  
  (0.334)  (0.319)  (0.304)  (0.316)  (0.223)  (0.199)  
Time fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Firm fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Wald X  84.54** 89.01** 114.23** 134.42*** 200.34*** 569.89*** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  -0.71 -0.91 -0.86 -0.81 -0.70 -1.12 
Hansen J test   168.62 139.58 149.06 172.34 149.27 153.78 
N = 1887 firm-year observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. † p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001 
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FIGURE 1 
 
The Moderating Effect of CEO Power on the Relationship between Inconsistent Feedback and R&D 
Search 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEO structural power CEO ownership power 
INCONSISTENT 
FEEDBACK 
Negative performance 
prospects 
Positive performance 
feedback 
R&D search 
CEO expert power CEO prestige power 
  
48 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Three-Way Interaction: Negative Prospects x  
Positive Feedback x CEO Structural Power on R&D Search 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Three-Way Interaction: Negative Prospects x  
Positive Feedback x CEO Ownership Power on R&D Search 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Three-Way Interaction: Negative Prospects x  
Positive Feedback x CEO Expert Power on R&D Search 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
Three-Way Interaction: Negative Prospects x  
Positive Feedback x CEO Prestige Power on R&D Search 
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